As Cairo strengthens diplomatic coordination with Somalia, Djibouti and other Red Sea states, Ethiopia faces a growing strategic dilemma: how can Africa’s second-most populous country secure its maritime future when neighbouring governments insist that control of the waterway belongs exclusively to coastal nations?
The battle for influence over the Red Sea is entering a new and potentially dangerous phase. Egypt is intensifying its diplomatic engagement across the Horn of Africa, promoting a regional security framework that places responsibility for the strategic waterway firmly in the hands of countries with Red Sea coastlines. For Ethiopia, a landlocked nation whose economic future depends on reliable access to international shipping, the implications could be considerable.
On November 7, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty held separate meetings with his Somali and Djiboutian counterparts in Tripoli, Libya, reaffirming Cairo’s position that the security and governance of the Red Sea should remain the exclusive responsibility of littoral states. The discussions followed broader regional consultations in October and highlighted Egypt’s determination to shape the diplomatic rules governing one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
Officially, the meetings concerned regional stability, sovereignty, economic cooperation and maritime security. Yet their significance extends beyond the language of conventional diplomacy. Egypt’s expanding engagement with governments around Ethiopia raises questions about whether Cairo is attempting to establish a regional consensus that could constrain Addis Ababa’s ambitions to secure greater maritime access.
Ethiopia is not a Red Sea coastal state, having lost direct access to the sea following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Nevertheless, its dependence on regional ports gives it a substantial economic stake in the waterway. Meanwhile, Somaliland, with its strategic coastline along the Gulf of Aden and the expanding port of Berbera, remains central to discussions about Ethiopia’s possible alternatives to Djibouti.
The emerging question is therefore not simply who patrols the Red Sea. It is whether the region’s future will be determined through exclusive diplomatic arrangements or through a broader system of economic cooperation that recognises the interests of coastal and landlocked countries alike.
Cairo’s diplomatic offensive gathers momentum
The November 7 meetings took place on the sidelines of the 22nd Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, known as CEN-SAD, in Tripoli. Abdelatty met Somali Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali and Djiboutian Foreign Minister Abdoulkader Hussein Omar separately, discussing bilateral cooperation and developments across the Horn of Africa.
According to the Egyptian account of the discussions, Cairo reiterated that responsibility for Red Sea security and governance rests with the countries bordering the waterway. Abdelatty also reaffirmed Egypt’s support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, while rejecting unilateral measures that could undermine those principles.
The discussions with Djibouti were particularly significant. Beyond maritime security, the ministers addressed cooperation in ports, logistics, infrastructure, energy, trade and investment. These are precisely the sectors through which regional influence can be translated into long-term economic relationships.
The November meetings also followed the October consultations at El Alamein, where Egypt engaged other regional governments on Red Sea security and political stability. Taken together, these diplomatic encounters suggest a sustained effort to consolidate Cairo’s position rather than a series of unrelated bilateral meetings.
Egypt’s argument has a straightforward legal and political foundation: coastal countries possess sovereign rights over their territory and territorial waters, and they have a direct responsibility for protecting their maritime environments. That principle is not inherently controversial.
The difficulty emerges when the concept of coastal responsibility is extended into a claim of exclusive political authority over regional security arrangements. International maritime law recognises navigation rights and other interests that extend beyond the sovereignty of individual coastal states. A country does not need to possess a coastline to have legitimate commercial, security or diplomatic interests in the movement of international shipping.
For Ethiopia, the distinction is fundamental. Addis Ababa is not claiming that its economic dependence automatically gives it sovereignty over another country’s ports. Its broader argument is that a nation of its size cannot reasonably be excluded from discussions about the transport corridors upon which its trade, industrial development and economic security depend.
Egypt’s diplomacy therefore creates an important test. Can Red Sea states establish effective maritime cooperation while accommodating the legitimate interests of neighbouring landlocked economies, or will regional security become another instrument of geopolitical competition?
Ethiopia’s maritime dilemma becomes a regional power struggle
Ethiopia’s search for dependable maritime access is neither new nor exclusively political. Since becoming landlocked in 1993, the country has relied heavily on Djibouti’s transport infrastructure to move imports and exports. That dependence has supported a valuable economic relationship between the two neighbours, but it has also exposed Ethiopia to the risks associated with relying on a limited number of international trade routes.
For a country with a population exceeding 130 million, access to ports is not merely a question of national prestige. It affects the price of imported fuel, industrial machinery, agricultural supplies and consumer goods. It influences the competitiveness of Ethiopian exports, the cost of manufacturing and the country’s capacity to attract international investment.
Ethiopia’s leaders have repeatedly argued that the country’s economic and demographic weight makes diversified maritime access a strategic necessity. Their pursuit of alternative routes has included discussions with neighbouring states and investment in transport connections linking the Ethiopian interior to regional ports.
The issue became particularly contentious in January 2024, when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland concerning potential access to the coast. The agreement generated strong opposition from Somalia, which considers Somaliland part of its sovereign territory despite the latter’s decades of self-government.
The subsequent Ankara Declaration between Ethiopia and Somalia in December 2024 offered a diplomatic framework for addressing their disagreements. It recognised the importance of Ethiopia’s access to the sea while emphasising respect for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, the broader strategic questions surrounding Somaliland, maritime access and regional political authority have not disappeared.
Egypt’s involvement introduces another layer of complexity. Cairo and Addis Ababa have long disagreed over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, particularly over water security, dam operations and the absence of a mutually accepted comprehensive agreement.
The Nile dispute and the Red Sea question are legally separate issues. Nevertheless, they intersect strategically because both concern Ethiopia’s growing economic influence and Egypt’s determination to protect what it regards as vital national interests.
It would be premature to conclude that every Egyptian diplomatic initiative in the Horn is designed to weaken Ethiopia. Egypt has legitimate reasons to pursue maritime security cooperation, particularly given the vulnerability of shipping routes connecting the Red Sea to the Suez Canal.
Yet the accumulation of diplomatic initiatives involving Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti is likely to attract close attention in Addis Ababa. Even without a formal anti-Ethiopian alliance, a shared regional position that excludes landlocked states from maritime security governance could narrow Ethiopia’s diplomatic options.
The danger is that competing interpretations of sovereignty and economic necessity could transform a manageable regional development challenge into a prolonged confrontation.
Djibouti faces an increasingly delicate balancing act
Among the countries involved in Egypt’s diplomatic outreach, Djibouti occupies a particularly sensitive position. Its location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait gives it enormous strategic importance, while its ports provide Ethiopia with a crucial commercial gateway to international markets.
Djibouti’s economy has developed around logistics, maritime transport and services connected to Ethiopian trade. Roads, railways, customs infrastructure and port facilities link the two countries in a relationship that benefits both sides. Ethiopia gains access to global shipping networks, while Djibouti earns revenue and employment from handling the commercial requirements of its much larger neighbour.
This economic interdependence complicates any attempt to interpret Djibouti’s growing cooperation with Egypt as evidence of a decisive geopolitical realignment.
For Djibouti, strengthening relations with Cairo could bring additional investment, infrastructure development, technical assistance and diplomatic influence. Egypt, meanwhile, has clear reasons to cultivate closer ties with a country situated at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
But Djibouti would also have much to lose from a serious deterioration in relations with Ethiopia. Disrupting established commercial corridors could damage port revenues and weaken the very economic foundations that have made Djibouti strategically important.
The November 7 discussions did not announce a military agreement directed against Ethiopia, nor did they establish that Djibouti had accepted a policy of excluding Addis Ababa from all regional maritime discussions. Egyptian statements emphasised cooperation among coastal countries, but the precise implications of that position remain open to interpretation. SIS+1
Djibouti’s most advantageous strategy may therefore be to maintain constructive relations with both Egypt and Ethiopia while resisting pressure to transform economic competition into political confrontation.
There is a broader lesson here. Djibouti’s prosperity demonstrates that the Horn of Africa can benefit from cooperation between coastal and landlocked countries. Its commercial relationship with Ethiopia is not an exception to regional integration; it is one of the clearest examples of how integration can work.
If the Red Sea becomes a diplomatic arena in which governments are encouraged to choose exclusive political camps, that economic achievement could become increasingly vulnerable.
Somaliland and Berbera: the alternative that changes the equation
No serious assessment of Ethiopia’s maritime future can ignore Somaliland. Situated along the Gulf of Aden, the self-governing territory possesses a coastline of considerable strategic importance and has spent decades developing institutions separate from those of the Somali federal government.
Somaliland declared the restoration of its independence in 1991, following the collapse of the Somali state. Since then, it has maintained its own political institutions, security forces and administrative structures. Its international status remains disputed, with Mogadishu continuing to reject its independence.
The port of Berbera has become one of Somaliland’s most important economic assets. Investment by DP World and associated transport developments have increased its potential to serve not only Somaliland’s domestic economy but also the wider Ethiopian market.
For Ethiopia, Berbera offers the prospect of diversifying maritime access and reducing dependence on a single principal transport corridor. For Somaliland, stronger commercial relations with Ethiopia could generate investment, employment and greater international visibility.
This relationship helps explain why the January 2024 Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding generated such intense opposition from Somalia. Mogadishu regarded the agreement as a challenge to its sovereignty, while Somaliland viewed its ability to negotiate international arrangements as an expression of its self-government.
Egypt’s repeated endorsement of Somalia’s territorial integrity is consistent with Cairo’s longstanding diplomatic position. However, in the current geopolitical environment, it also reinforces opposition to initiatives that might advance Somaliland’s international standing without Mogadishu’s consent.
The October 4 El Alamein Declaration made this position particularly explicit, rejecting recognition of Somaliland and reaffirming support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. This was not merely a general statement about African borders; it directly addressed one of the most contentious political questions in the Horn of Africa. Presidency+1
Yet Somaliland’s political status and the economic utility of Berbera are distinct questions. International recognition remains disputed, but the port’s geographical position and commercial potential are tangible realities.
A more integrated regional economy could accommodate trade through Berbera while encouraging political negotiations over the unresolved sovereignty dispute. The alternative is to treat commercial connectivity as a threat, potentially sacrificing economic opportunities to competing national claims.
Somaliland’s future should ultimately be determined through peaceful political processes that take seriously the aspirations of its population, the interests of neighbouring countries and the requirements of regional stability.
What is increasingly difficult to ignore is that Somaliland already occupies a significant position in the Horn’s emerging maritime economy. Attempts to construct a comprehensive regional security architecture without addressing that reality risk producing arrangements that are politically contested from the outset.
The Nile dispute casts a long shadow over the Red Sea
Egypt’s maritime diplomacy cannot be fully understood without examining its longstanding disagreement with Ethiopia over the Nile.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has transformed the political debate surrounding the river. Ethiopia regards the project as a major achievement in its effort to expand electricity generation, support industrial development and improve living standards. Egypt, whose agriculture and water supply depend heavily on the Nile, has consistently sought legally binding arrangements governing dam operations and the protection of downstream water interests.
Both countries have substantial national interests at stake, but their disagreements have persisted despite years of negotiations and diplomatic interventions.
The October 4 summit demonstrated how these disputes are increasingly discussed within a broader regional framework. The El Alamein Declaration addressed both maritime security and transboundary water cooperation, including principles relating to avoiding significant harm and consulting on river projects. Presidency+1
This combination is politically significant. The Nile and Red Sea are different geographical and legal questions, yet Egypt’s diplomatic engagement brings them into conversations with several of Ethiopia’s neighbours.
From Cairo’s perspective, such coordination can be presented as an effort to defend international law, protect national security and promote regional stability. From Addis Ababa’s perspective, the same developments may appear to increase diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia across several strategic fronts.
The tensions have also acquired a more confrontational character. Reporting in October described worsening relations between Ethiopia and several neighbouring countries, including mutual accusations concerning interference and regional security. These allegations remain contested and should not be treated as established facts without independent evidence. Al-Monitor+1
The risk is that disputes which could be managed through separate negotiations become mutually reinforcing. A disagreement over Nile water management might influence positions on maritime access, while a confrontation over Somaliland could further damage trust between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Such a cycle would benefit few countries in the region.
Ethiopia’s economic development does not inherently threaten Egypt’s security, just as Egypt’s legitimate water concerns do not automatically justify restricting Ethiopia’s access to regional markets. Both countries would gain from mechanisms that separate practical cooperation from political rivalry.
The challenge is whether their governments, and the wider regional diplomatic system, can resist the temptation to turn every strategic disagreement into a test of regional influence.
A region at a crossroads: cooperation or confrontation?
The diplomatic activity of recent weeks points towards several possible futures for the Horn of Africa. One is the emergence of a more coordinated Red Sea security framework led by Egypt and its coastal partners, with Ethiopia remaining outside its central decision-making structures. Such an arrangement could strengthen cooperation among participating governments, but it could also deepen suspicions in Addis Ababa and encourage Ethiopia to pursue alternative partnerships.
Another possibility is a more flexible regional system in which coastal sovereignty is respected while landlocked countries participate in discussions affecting trade, infrastructure and maritime security. This approach would acknowledge that the security of the Red Sea depends not only on naval capabilities and territorial jurisdiction but also on the economic stability of the countries connected to its ports.
The second path offers greater potential for lasting regional development. Ethiopia needs dependable maritime access, Djibouti needs the commercial opportunities generated by Ethiopian trade, Somaliland seeks economic development and international engagement, and Egypt needs secure navigation through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.
These interests are not necessarily incompatible. Indeed, they could provide the foundation for an ambitious regional integration programme involving ports, railways, electricity networks, industrial corridors and coordinated maritime protection.
The immediate danger is that diplomacy becomes a competition to exclude rather than an opportunity to cooperate.
Egypt’s latest consultations demonstrate that Cairo is determined to remain an influential architect of the Red Sea’s political future. The October summit and November meetings provide evidence of sustained diplomatic coordination, although they do not establish that a comprehensive anti-Ethiopian alliance has been created.
For Ethiopia, the challenge is to protect its economic interests without allowing maritime ambitions to escalate into confrontation with its neighbours. For Somalia and Somaliland, the challenge is to address their unresolved political dispute without closing the door to regional commercial opportunities.
And for Djibouti, perhaps more than any other country, the challenge is to preserve the economic benefits of cooperation while navigating increasingly complicated regional rivalries.
The Horn of Africa possesses the ports, markets, natural resources and strategic location necessary to become one of the continent’s most dynamic economic regions. What it lacks is a durable political framework capable of transforming competing national interests into shared prosperity.
Egypt is seeking to define the future of the Red Sea. Ethiopia is determined to secure its place in the regional maritime economy. Somaliland is striving to convert its strategic geography into greater economic and political opportunity.
The question now is whether these ambitions will produce a more connected Horn of Africa — or whether the struggle to control the Red Sea will divide the region before its enormous economic potential can be realised.